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Abstract
There is growing concern that decision-making informed by machine learning (ML) algorithms may unfairly discriminate 
based on personal demographic attributes, such as race and gender. Scholars have responded by introducing numerous 
mathematical definitions of fairness to test the algorithm, many of which are in conflict with one another. However, these 
reductionist representations of fairness often bear little resemblance to real-life fairness considerations, which in practice 
are highly contextual. Moreover, fairness metrics tend to be implemented within narrow and targeted fairness toolkits for 
algorithm assessments that are difficult to integrate into an algorithm’s broader ethical assessment. In this paper, we derive 
lessons from ethical philosophy and welfare economics as they relate to the contextual factors relevant for fairness. In par-
ticular we highlight the debate around the acceptability of particular inequalities and the inextricable links between fairness, 
welfare and autonomy. We propose Key Ethics Indicators (KEIs) as a way towards providing a more holistic understanding 
of whether or not an algorithm is aligned to the decision-maker’s ethical values.
Keywords Algorithmic fairness · Algorithmic ethics · Machine learning · Key ethics indicators · Ethical trade-offs
1 Introduction
Algorithms are increasingly used to inform critical decisions 
across high-impact domains, from credit risk evaluation to 
hiring to criminal justice. These algorithms are using more 
data from non-traditional sources and employing advanced 
techniques in machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) 
that are often difficult to interpret. The result is rising con-
cern that these algorithmic predictions may be misaligned 
to the designer’s intent, an organisation’s legal obligations, 
and societal expectations, such as discriminating based on 
personal demographic attributes, e.g. gender and race. In 
response, there has been a proliferation of literature on algo-
rithmic fairness aiming to quantify the deviation of their 
predictions from a formalised metric of equality between 
groups (e.g. male and female). Dozens of metrics of fairness 
have been proposed, prompting efforts [57] to disentangle 
their differences and rationale.
In line with this, a number of fairness toolkits1 have been 
introduced, providing the means for testing the algorithm’s 
predictions against various fairness definitions. The fairness 
toolkit landscape so far reflects the reductionist understand-
ing of fairness as mathematical conditions, as the implemen-
tations rely on narrowly defined fairness metrics to provide 
“pass/fail” reports. These toolkits can sometimes give practi-
tioners conflicting information about an algorithm’s fairness, 
which is unsurprising given that it is mathematically impos-
sible to meet some of the fairness conditions simultaneously 
[37]. This is reflective of the conflicting visions of fairness 
espoused by each mathematical definition and the underlying 
ethical assumptions [6].
A recent paper surveying the fairness toolkit landscape 
[42] found there were significant gaps between ML practi-
tioner needs and the toolkits’ features, especially regarding 
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means that helped practitioners account for the contextual 
specifics of their use case – one practitioner comment-
ing the toolkits “make everything look clear-cut, which 
it really isn’t ‘in the wild’ ” [42]. Other studies involving 
ML practitioners have similarly emphasised the need for 
domain-specific and contextual factors to be closely con-
sidered to improve algorithmic fairness [56]. In particular, 
in many domains, practitioners claim that fairness cannot 
be understood in terms of well-defined quantitative met-
rics [29].
This disconnect between real-world needs and axiomatic 
fairness definitions is not new. Hutchinson and Mitchell [30] 
warn of the gap between the unambiguous formalisation of 
fairness metrics and the contextual and practical needs of 
society, politics, and law. They compared the recent surge 
in ML fairness research to literature from the 60s and 70s, 
which fizzled as “no statistic that could unambiguously 
indicate whether or not an item is fair was identified. There 
were no broad technical solutions to the issues involved 
in fairness” [9]. From a legal standpoint, the approach in 
automating “fairness testing” appears incompatible with the 
requirements of EU non-discrimination law, which relies 
heavily on the context-sensitive, intuitive, and ambiguous 
evidence [58].
Fairness toolkits aim to be widely accessible, drawing 
attention to common fairness considerations, and encour-
aging and supporting practitioners to consider, assess (and 
therefore mitigate) their algorithms in leading to unfair 
outcomes. However, without a consideration of the rel-
evant context in the socio-technical system surrounding the 
algorithm, these tools risk engendering false confidence in 
flawed algorithms. Different considerations come into play 
for each use case. That is, organisations should not rely 
solely on one-dimensional algorithmic fairness metrics to 
account for its ethical concerns. These narrow applications 
of fairness could mislead organisational strategy, risk man-
agement, and policies.
Towards this, in this paper we draw from literature in 
ethical philosophy and welfare economics to pinpoint the 
relevant contextual information that should be considered 
in an understanding of a model’s ethical impact. We argue 
that any future development of fairness toolkits should be 
framed within a broader view of ethical concerns to ensure 
their adoption promotes a contextually appropriate assess-
ment of each algorithm.
To this end, we propose a new approach using Key Ethics 
Indicators (KEIs) to provide a more holistic understanding 
of whether or not an algorithm is aligned to the decision-
maker’s values. Though resembling some previous work 
on domain-specific trade-off analyses in fairness metrics 
vs. public safety [11] and vs. financial inclusion [41], our 
paper generalises the steps required for a holistic ethical 
assessment.
Our contribution is two-fold: (1) the identification of rel-
evant contextual factors for fairness as drawn from ethical 
philosophy and welfare economics and (2) the proposal of a 
“Key Ethics Indicator” approach for a more comprehensive 
understanding of an algorithm’s potential impact.
2  Definitions
We start by defining key terms: ethics, justice, fairness, 
equality, discrimination, and protected characteristics. 
This will frame our subsequent discussions on the contex-
tual considerations for algorithmic ethics beyond what can 
be assessed using fairness metrics. While these dimensions 
the terms cover do not comprehensively cover all relevant 
aspects of algorithmic ethics, they clearly demonstrate 
the limitations of mathematical fairness formalisations 
in capturing necessary information about the algorithmic 
system.
As many organisations have launched initiatives to 
establish ethical principles, “AI ethics” definitions may 
vary; however, Floridi and Cowls identify the five com-
mon themes across these sets of principles: beneficence, 
non-maleficence, autonomy, justice, and explicability [20]. 
We define algorithmic ethics along these five dimensions.
A study of proposed ethical principles finds that the 
different countries’ and organisations’ understanding of 
justice varies for each document, from the elimination of 
discrimination to promoting diversity to shared prosper-
ity [20]. For the purposes of this paper, we distinguish 
between justice and fairness in accordance with legal and 
organisational science literature, with justice denoting 
adherence to the standards agreed upon in society (e.g. 
based on laws) and fairness as a related principle of an 
evaluative judgement of whether a decision is morally 
right [25].
In line with this definition, fairness is inherently subjec-
tive. The concept is based on the egalitarian foundation 
that humans are fundamentally equal and should be treated 
equally. However, how equality should be measured and 
to what extent it is desirable have been a source of debate 
in both philosophical ethics from a moral standpoint, and 
welfare economics from a market efficiency standpoint. 
What are the relevant criteria based on which limited 
resources should be distributed? For example, Aristotle 
wrote that if there are fewer flutes available than people 
who want to play them, they should be given to the best 
performers [3].
From a legal standpoint, discrimination refers to the 
notion that certain demographic characteristics, such as 
race and gender, should not result in a relative disadvan-
tage of deprivation. Non-discrimination laws aim to not 
only prevent ongoing discrimination but also to change 
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societal policies and practices to achieve more substan-
tive equality—an aim which is described as incompatible 
with some fairness metrics [59]. While legal analysis is 
outside the scope of this paper, we refer to protected char-
acteristics as those commonly referenced and reflected in 
non-discrimination laws, such as race and ethnicity, gen-
der, religion, age, disability, and sexual orientation, given 
these personal demographic features are central to discus-
sions in algorithmic fairness literature. We also refer to 
‘direct’ discrimination, which concerns differential treat-
ment based on a protected characteristic and “indirect” 
discrimination, which represents an inadvertent negative 
impact on a protected group [59].
3  Computer science literature
3.1  Fairness metrics
Existing mathematical definitions of fairness, while 
loosely derived from a notion of egalitarianism, should 
be calculated while keeping in mind the nuances and con-
text-specificity present in philosophical discourse. We 
will walk through a use case: a lender building a model 
to predict a prospective borrower’s risk of default on a 
loan. In this case, the false positives (FP) represent lost 
opportunity (predicted default, but would have repaid), and 
the False Negatives (FN) represent lost revenue (predicted 
repayment, but defaulted).
The calculations of error rates used in the metrics are 
defined below, with some of the most commonly cited fair-
ness definitions in Table 1:
• True positive rate (TPR) = TP/(TP + FN)
• True negative rate (TNR) = TN/(FP + TN)
• False positive rate (FPR) = FP/(FP + TN) = 1 – TNR
• False negative rate (FNR) = FN/(FN + TP) = 1 – TPR
• Positive predictive value (PPV) = TP/(TP+FP)
There are difficulties in deciding which metric is most 
appropriate for each use case [41]. Is a 3% increase in posi-
tive predictive parity preferable over a 5% increase in equal 
odds? Moreover that many of these metrics cannot be satis-
fied at the same time [37], it is not intuitive on which metric 
best represents the lender’s interests. These issues will be 
further discussed in §3, where we will link each fairness 
Table 1  Fairness metrics and their intuitions
Fairness metric Equalising Intuition (example)
Maximise total accuracy N/A The most accurate model gives people the loan 
and interest rate they ‘deserve’ by minimising 
errors
Demographic parity, group fairness, disparate 
impact [18]
Outcome Black and white applicants have the same loan 
approval rates
Equal opportunity / false negative error rate 
balance [27]
FNR Among applicants who would default, both 
black and white applicants should have similar 
rate of their loans being denied
False positive error rate balance / predictive 
equality [7]
FPR Among applicants who are credit-worthy and 
would have repaid their loans, both black and 
white applicants should have similar rate of 
their loans being approved
Equal odds [27] TPR, TNR Meets both of above conditions
Positive predictive parity [7] PPV Among credit-worthy applicants, the probability 
of predicting repayment is the same regardless 
of race
Positive class balance [37] Average probability of positive class Both credit-worthy white and black applicants 
who repay their loans have an equal average 
probability score
Negative class balance [37] Average probability of negative class Both white and black defaulters have an equal 
average probability score
Counterfactual fairness [39] Prediction in a counterfactual scenario in 
which the person had a different protected 
feature
For each individual, if he/she were a different 
race, the prediction would be the same
Individual fairness [14] Outcome for ‘similar’ individuals For each individual, he/she has the same 
outcome as another ‘similar’ individual of a 
different race
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metric to its philosophical origin and address the gaps. The 
gaps, in particular, demonstrate the important nuances that 
cannot be captured in fairness metrics that must be consid-
ered in the model development process. In the next section, 
we challenge the types of inequalities that the fairness met-
rics assume are acceptable vs. unacceptable.
3.2  Acceptability of inequalities
First, we challenge the fairness metrics’ assumed simplic-
ity of unacceptable bias, as well as the assumed possi-
bility of separating what is acceptable vs. unacceptable 
biases, by discussing the complexity of the debates on 
equality in ethical philosophy. Note that these metrics are 
aimed at a class of machine learning algorithms that are 
supervised, i.e. with a known outcome, and for classifica-
tion purposes, i.e. for a discrete outcome (e.g. default vs. 
repayment) rather than a continuous outcome (e.g. amount 
repaid). These algorithms aim to identify the features that 
are associated with the outcome of interest. For example, 
one with higher income is more likely to be approved for 
a loan due to its association with higher ability to repay. In 
this case, differences in socioeconomic status is accepted 
as an inequality that is important to consider in the loan 
decision. Previously, scholars have made the distinction 
between “acceptable” vs. “unacceptable” inequalities 
based on legal precedents between “explainable” and 
“non-explainable” discrimination [33] based on Rawlsian 
philosophy between “relevant” and “irrelevant” features 
[49]. For example, income may be considered a “relevant” 
feature, and gender or race may be considered an “irrele-
vant” feature. The former should influence the algorithmic 
decisions, but the latter should not.
Scholars attempting to formalise these criteria into a 
mathematical definition of fairness have needed to address 
what type of equality is deemed to be fair. Some assume 
that any disparity in a given outcome metric is unacceptable 
[22]: for example, loan approval rate for men and women 
should be the same. Others assume a level playing field [22]: 
for example, there is no gender or racial discrimination in 
the real world that may affect the data. More recent work 
has taken a more nuanced stance, suggesting that the only 
features that should contribute to the outcome disparity are 
those that can be controlled by the individual, emphasis-
ing a distinction between the features driven by “effort” vs. 
“circumstances” [28]. This is following the logic of Dwor-
kin’s theory of Resource Egalitarianism, no one should end 
up worse off due to bad luck, but rather, people should be 
given differentiated economic benefits as a result of their 
own choices [15].
The choice of mathematical fairness formalisation deter-
mines which inequalities are “unacceptable.” Some assume 
that all disparity in a given outcome metric is unacceptable, 
while others assume a level playing field [22], an assumption 
rarely met in societal challenges. Others emphasise the need 
to separate “effort” and “circumstances,” suggesting that the 
only features that should contribute to the outcome dispar-
ity are those that can be controlled by the individual [28]. 
Another paper distinguishes between “benign” disparities 
and “structural bias” that should be corrected [6].
In reality, the layers of inequality between two individuals 
are intertwined, dynamic, and difficult to disentangle from 
one another. Consider the layers of inequality in Table 2. 
Two individuals may be unequal on several levels—in their 
level and type of talent, parents’ socioeconomic status, 
behaviour, etc.—that may affect the target outcome of inter-
est, whether it is credit-worthiness, predicted performance 
at a job, or insurance risk. It is possible that the differences 
in the observed outcome are attributable to one or more of 
the above inequalities. Building an algorithm to predict the 
outcome could result in a faithful representation of these 
inequalities and the resulting replication and perpetuation 
of the same inequality through decisions informed by its 
predictions. However, which of the inequalities should be 
allowed to influence the model’s prediction? We present the 
limitations of proposals thus far on how this question should 
be addressed.
3.2.1  Legally protected characteristics
The open source fairness toolkits often refer specifically 
to protected attributes in their assessment of fairness. For 
Table 2  Layers of inequality affecting the ground truth (partial and indicative)
Types of inequality Examples Variable
Natural inequality Disability at birth Inequality 0
Socioeconomic inequality Parents’/guardians’ assets Inequality 1
Talent inequality Intelligence, skills, employment prospects Inequality 2
Preference inequality Saving behaviour, cultural prioritisation of values associated with economic opportuni-
ties
Inequality 3
Treatment inequality / societal discrimi-
nation (external)
Discrimination in job market and education system affecting income stability Inequality 4
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example, the Fairness 360 toolkit defines protected attrib-
ute one that “partitions a population into groups whose out-
comes should have parity. Examples include race, gender, 
caste, and religion” [5]. While they acknowledge protected 
attributes may be application-specific, there is limited guid-
ance on under what circumstances two groups should have 
parity in outcomes. In addition, how much disparity is 
acceptable in each use case and for each sub-group of inter-
est? In order for fairness metrics to be used across domain 
areas, it is important for practitioners to have a clear idea 
of what types of demographic features are acceptable vs. 
unacceptable to consider in an algorithm. However, often, 
computer science literature use these demographic features 
to assess fairness without challenging whether they are rel-
evant to the decision at-hand.
Whether a disparity in fairness metrics between legally 
protected groups is fair depends on the context. Race and 
gender may be causally relevant in differential medical diag-
nosis (e.g. sickle cell anaemia, ovarian cancer) due to the dif-
ferent biological mechanisms in question. If the differences 
in outcome are causally related to the protected feature, the 
difference in decisions may be arguably fair. If a man has a 
higher income than a woman, he may receive a higher credit 
limit given his higher ability to repay.
3.2.2  Effort vs. circumstances
The suggestion to distinguish between the features driven 
by “effort” vs. “circumstances” in algorithmic fairness [28] 
follows the logic of Dworkin’s theory of Resource Egali-
tarianism, no one should end up worse off due to bad luck, 
but rather, people should be given differentiated economic 
benefits as a result of their own choices [15].
However, in reality, it is difficult to separate out what is 
within an individual’s genuine control. For example, a credit 
market does not exist in a vacuum; while potential borrowers 
can improve their creditworthiness to a certain extent, e.g. 
by building employable skills and establishing a responsible 
payment history, it is difficult to isolate the features from 
discrimination in other markets, layers of inequality, and the 
impact of their personal history.
In addition to the challenge of defining what is within 
our control, some circumstances are necessary to take into 
account in a decision-making process. For example, one may 
not be in full control of one’s income or education level, but 
they are crucial indicators of credit risk given they indicate 
greater job security. Socioeconomic and talent inequalities 
may be considered relevant in a credit risk evaluation algo-
rithm, but they are not necessarily within our control.
3.2.3  Source of inequality
Scholars have also proposed that the source of inequal-
ity should determine which fairness metric is appropri-
ate for each use case, i.e. whether the outcome disparity 
is explainable, justifiable, or benign or due to structural 
discrimination [6, 33]. Binns (2020) suggests group fair-
ness metrics assumes disparities are benign, e.g. the loan 
approval difference between white and black applicants is 
solely due to their differences in ability to repay; statistical 
parity assumes structural bias that requires correction, e.g. 
historically, black applicants’ risk have been inflated due 
to past discriminatory practices. However, in reality, there 
is rarely such a separation. For example, Lee and Floridi 
review the literature on U.S. mortgage lending and suggest 
that there are many structural and statistical factors that 
lead the lenders to both over-estimate and under-estimate 
the risk of black borrowers [41].
Any attempt to isolate the impact of discrimination from 
the impact of “benign” inequality needs to also consider 
the intersectional discrimination faced by those already 
marginalised in society [12], e.g. the inter-connectivity 
of gender and racial discrimination [10]. The boundary 
between what is an acceptable representation of existing 
inequalities and what is due to systematic discrimination 
and marginalisation of a group is challenging to ascertain.
Fleurbaey also cautions that “responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism” in welfare economics could be used to 
hastily justify inequalities and unfairly chastise the “unde-
serving poor” [19]. He points out that the idea that people 
should bear the consequences of their choices is not as 
simple as it seems; it only makes sense when individuals 
are put in equal conditions of choice. Such an equality is 
not true in most systems. When one has fewer opportu-
nities than another, one cannot be held fully responsible 
insofar as one’s choice is more constrained.
3.2.4  Takeaways
The assumed clear and intuitive separation between 
acceptable and unacceptable inequalities, whether based 
on their source or the role of luck, rarely exists in real-
life models. Not only is making the distinction impracti-
cal, the boundary itself is more controversially debated 
than it is often portrayed in algorithmic fairness literature 
(especially in computer science). The criteria for desirable 
equality depend on the philosophical perspective, which is 
ultimately a subjective judgement.
The decision on the target state—the way it ought to 
be—is an ethical decision with mathematically inevitable 
trade-offs between objectives of interest. Heidari et al. dis-
miss the distinction between relevant vs. irrelevant features 
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in practice as out of scope for their paper: “Determining 
accountability features and effort-based utility is arguably 
outside the expertise of computer scientists” [28]. On the 
contrary, we argue that computer scientists and model 
developers must be actively engaged in the discussion on 
what layers of inequality should and should not be influ-
encing the model’s prediction, as this directly influences 
not only the model design and feature selection but also 
the selection of performance metrics.
4  Lessons from ethical philosophy on (in)
equalities
Ethical philosophers have long debated whether equality is 
desirable and—if so—what type of equality people should 
pursue in society. Table 3 gives an example of philosophical 
perspectives and their perceptions of what types of inequal-
ity are acceptable. Formal equality of opportunity (EOP), or 
procedural fairness, posits that all opportunities should be 
equally open to all applicants (e.g. jobs, loans, etc.) based on 
a relevant definition of merit. However, in theory, this can 
be fully satisfied even if it is only a minority segment of a 
population (e.g. those with family wealth and connections) 
that have realistic prospects of accessing the opportunity. 
In other words, as long as the opportunity is theoretically 
available, it is irrelevant whether it is practically accessible.
The Rawlsian fair EOP goes further to propose that any 
individuals with the same native talent and ambition should 
have the same prospects of success, requiring that all com-
petitive advantage (e.g. parental efforts) be offset [49]. This 
is at odds with Lockean and libertarian ideals that assert 
the value of each person’s freedom insofar as there is no 
harm to another [46], which naturally extends to the right to 
ownership and capital. Rawls also proposes the Difference 
Principle as an exception: economic and social inequalities 
can only be justified if they benefit the most disadvantaged 
members of society [49]. These EOP principles are in con-
trast to the strict equality of outcome, condition, or welfare, 
which requires an equal distribution regardless of any rel-
evant criteria.
Luck egalitarians hold that unchosen inequalities must be 
eliminated [15]. Sen and Fleurbaey object on the grounds 
that luck egalitarians have no principled objection to a soci-
ety in which, on a background of equal opportunities, some 
end up in poverty or as the slaves of others [19]. They argue 
for a more substantive equality of “autonomy” that includes 
the full range of individual freedom.
Some have argued that what is important is not relative 
condition compared to other people, but rather, whether 
people have enough to have satisfactory life prospects [60]. 
Others have shifted the focus on the incremental gain of 
well-being of those who are worst-off [47]. Yet others have 
debated the foundations of desert, or what one deserves cor-
responding to his or her virtue [32].
4.1  Ethical subjectivity of algorithmic fairness
As such, what types of inequality in outcome are fair is a 
philosophical and subjective debate with nuances and com-
plexities insufficiently addressed in existing algorithmic fair-
ness literature. What happens when faithfully representing 
the world as it is perpetuates an unfair state of affairs? This 
complicates the objective of machine learning, which is only 
‘reliable’ insofar as it is trained on data sets that reflects 
Table 3  Key philosophical perspectives on inequality
Philosophical perspective Acceptable inequalities Unacceptable inequalities
Formal equality of opportunity/procedural fair-
ness [26]
Any inequality as long as the opportunity was 
open to all
Treatment inequality
“Fair equality of opportunity” [49, 50] Natural, talent, and preference inequalities Socioeconomic, treatment inequalities
Rawlsian EOP + Difference principle [49] Natural, talent, and preference inequalities, plus 
any inequality benefiting the most disadvan-
taged society members in long-term impact
Socioeconomic, treatment inequalities
Equality of outcome/condition/welfare [26] None - all members should get the exact same 
outcome
All
Luck egalitarianism [15] Effort-based inequalities (e.g. preference) Circumstances (e.g. natural inequality)
Equality of freedom/autonomy [53] Inequality resulting in “genuinely free” choices Any inequality hindering freedom
Sufficiency/equality of capability [60] Any inequality as long as everyone is above the 
level of sufficiency
Any resulting in people falling below suf-
ficiency levels
Prioritarianism [47, 52] Any inequality reduction should prioritise 
resource allocation to those who are worst off
None as long as the worst off are prioritised
Desert [31, 32] Any inequality based on what he/she “deserves” Any inequality that does not equate to the 
person’s deservingness
535AI and Ethics (2021) 1:529–544 
1 3
reality. For example, online searches for “CEO” yield mostly 
images of white men, and due to the skewed gender distribu-
tion in senior positions, online job postings may show high-
income positions to men more frequently than women [55]. 
This may result in a biased outcome, with men securing 
disproportionately high-paying jobs. However, this is reflec-
tive of the existing gender pay gap: in 2019, only 6.6% of 
Fortune 500 top executives were female, the highest propor-
tion in history [62]. Continuing to under-represent women 
in search results may perpetuate the bias that CEOs are typi-
cally men. In this instance, some call for the “correction” of 
the bias to reflect judgements about the way the world should 
be, which is by nature an ethically influenced choice.
As previously stated, and in contrast to past scholars’ 
arguments [28], our position is that computer scientists and 
model developers cannot completely delegate this consid-
eration to a third party, whether it is the regulator, busi-
ness leader, or the risk function. Model developers must 
be engaged in the discussion on what layers of inequality 
should and should not be influencing the model’s prediction 
in order to inform their decisions on model design, feature 
selection, and performance metric selection.
Overall, in formalising fairness, the decision-maker 
should be explicit on (i) which inequalities and biases exist 
that affect the outcome of interest, and (ii) on which of them 
should be retained and which of them should be actively 
corrected. This will be further addressed later, with our pro-
posal for Key Ethics Indicators (KEIs). We next link some 
of the fairness metrics to the ethical philosophy that inspired 
them, pointing out the contextual considerations in the ethi-
cal philosophy that should be kept in mind alongside the 
fairness formalisations.
4.2  Linking ethical philosophy to algorithmic 
fairness
Mathematical definitions of fairness, while loosely derived 
from a notion of egalitarianism, should be calculated while 
keeping in mind the nuances and context-specificity present 
in philosophical discourse. Revisiting the fairness metrics 
from Table 1, this section will link each metric to the ethical 
philosophy that inspired it, as well as addressing the gaps 
between the philosophical work and what is represented in 
the mathematical formula.
We now discuss the entries of Table 4 in order. Accuracy 
maximisation is prone to biases introduced in the model 
development lifecycle that may skew the predictions, which 
is especially problematic if the biases reflect patterns of 
societal discrimination, leading to “undeserved” outcomes 
contrary to the philosophy of desert. Demographic parity 
is problematic if there are legitimate rationale behind the 
unequal outcome (e.g. unequal income).
The equal opportunity metric, while it sounds attractively 
similar to Rawlsian EOP, fails to address discrimination that 
may already be embedded in the data [22]. Discrimination 
may be crystallised in the data set due to biased data col-
lection (e.g. selective marketing), biased data labelling (e.g. 
humans scoring male candidates as more competent), or 
biased human decisions feeding the system (e.g. if courts 
are more likely to find black defendants as guilty). Rawlsian 
EOP also assumes that inequalities in native talent and ambi-
tion may result in unequal outcomes, which is not addressed 
in the equalisation of false negative rates. Each group fair-
ness metric, including equal odds, positive predictive par-
ity, and positive / negative class balance, requires different 
assumptions about the gap between the observed space (fea-
tures) vs. the construct space (unobservable variables): “if 
there is structural bias in the decision pipeline, no [group 
Table 4  Fairness metrics and their philosophical origins
Fairness metric Equalising Philosophy
Maximise total accuracy N/A Desert [31, 32]
Demographic parity, group fairness, disparate impact 
[18]
Outcome Strict egalitarianism (Equality of outcome / 
condition / welfare) [26]
Equal opportunity / false negative error rate balance 
[27]
FNR “Fair equality of opportunity” [49, 50]
False positive error rate balance / predictive equality [7] FPR
Equal odds [27] TPR, TNR
Positive predictive parity [7] PPV
Positive class balance [37] Average probability of positive class
Negative class balance [37] Average probability of negative class
Counterfactual fairness [39] Prediction in a counter-factual scenario 
in which the person had a different 
attribute
David Lewis, cause and effect [44]
Individual fairness [14] Outcome for “similar” individuals Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism [19]
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fairness] mechanism can guarantee fairness”[21]. This is 
supported in a critique of existing classification parity met-
rics, in which the authors conclude that “to the extent that 
error metrics differ across groups, that tells us more about 
the shapes of the risk distributions than about the quality of 
decisions” [11]. In many domains in which there are con-
cerns over unfair algorithmic bias, including credit risk and 
employment, there has often been a documented history of 
structural and societal discrimination, which may affect the 
underlying data through biases previously discussed.
The challenge of individual fairness is: how to define “simi-
larity” that is, for example, independent of race [36]. When 
the predictive features are also influenced by protected fea-
tures, designation of a measurement of “similarity” cannot be 
independent of those protected features. For example, what 
proportion of gender income disparity is due to structural 
employment discrimination as opposed to job preferences? 
Some scholars have attempted to incorporate active correc-
tions for racial inequality into metrics of similarity [14], but 
this depends heavily on the assumption that the inequality due 
to racial discrimination can be isolated from other sources of 
inequality.
While counter-factual fairness metrics provide an elegant 
abstraction of the algorithm, the causal mechanisms, e.g. 
of a default on a loan or on insurance risk, are typically not 
well understood. It is also difficult to isolate the impact of 
one’s protected feature, e.g. race, on the outcome, e.g. risk 
of default, from the remaining features. The approach is also 
sensitive to unmeasured confounding variables, which may 
add additional discriminatory bias [35]. Confounders are 
especially difficult to determine for complex models.
In all, these metrics do not give any information on which 
layers of inequalities they are attempting to correct, which 
risks over- or under-correction. A deeper engagement with 
the ethical assumptions being made in each model is nec-
essary to understand the drivers of the unequal outcomes. 
What types of inequalities are acceptable depends on the 
context of the model. Our KEI approach will account for 
such context-specificity of what inequalities are acceptable.
5  Lessons from welfare economics
By focusing narrowly on the fairness metrics, which quantify 
the redistribution of the target outcome, a decision-maker 
may overlook the key considerations of the impact on the 
stakeholders’ welfare and autonomy. Because of the chal-
lenge in quantifying the relevant biases and disentangling 
them from the outcome of interest, correcting for a bias car-
ries the risk of increasing the inaccuracies of the predictions.
Referring back to our definition of algorithmic ethics, 
justice is only one of five dimensions (beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy, justice, and explicability), with fair-
ness as a key principle related to justice. We derive lessons 
from literature on welfare economics to demonstrate the 
inter-connectedness of fairness and welfare (beneficience 
and non-maleficence) and liberty (autonomy and explica-
bility). Beyond the egalitarian perspective on the relative 
distribution of resources between individuals and groups, 
it is important to consider the aggregate impact of an algo-
rithm on the society.
5.1  Welfare in algorithmic ethics: beneficence 
and non‑maleficence
We now use an example concerning credit risk evalua-
tion to argue that fairness should be considered along-
side welfare. In attempting to improve a fairness score, 
a decision-maker may inadvertently forego an algorithm 
that leaves everyone better-off (beneficence) or may inad-
vertently harm the sub-group they are attempting to help. 
Fairness metrics should not be taken at face value without 
an understanding of how relying on these metrics may 
affect other ethical objectives. Fairness toolkits that assess 
fairness in isolation risks misleading the decision-makers 
by giving the them incomplete information about whether 
their algorithm meets their ethical objectives.
From a welfare economic standpoint, a notion of fair-
ness includes a consideration of well-being: from both 
utilitarian and libertarian perspectives, a fair reward prin-
ciple maximises the sum total of individual well-being 
levels while legitimising redistribution that enhances the 
total outcome of individuals [19]. This is not necessar-
ily contradictory to the egalitarian perspectives discussed 
in ethical philosophy. In accordance with the Difference 
Principle, Rawlsian EOP Max-Min social welfare function 
should also maximise the welfare of those who are worst-
off [49]. A model that results in financial harm of already-
disadvantaged populations fails to meet the Rawlsian EOP 
criteria, even if the False Negative Rates are equalised as 
per the mathematical definition. Without consideration of 
the long-term impact on welfare, the fairness metrics fail 
to capture the full extent of ethical dilemma embedded in 
a model selection process.
Accuracy is often considered in trade-off with fairness 
[37], but from an ethical standpoint, that accuracy may rep-
resent a key principle in beneficence or non-maleficence. For 
an example of beneficence, a “good” credit risk algorithm 
would lower the aggregate portfolio risk for the lender, ena-
bling more loans to more people and giving them access 
to credit that is crucial to upward socioeconomic mobility. 
For an example of non-maleficence, the false positive rates 
(i.e. loans that were approved but defaulted) also contains 
information about whether unaffordable loans are granted. 
A lender should aim to minimise the borrower’s financial 
difficulty, given the adverse effects of unaffordable debt on 
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both the market level (causing instability and a “bubble”) 
and for the borrower [1].
The ethical principle of non-maleficence may be in 
direct conflict with fairness in some circumstances. Adding 
fairness constraints may end up harming the groups they 
intended to protect in the long-term [45]. In the presence 
of a feedback loop, we need to consider not only provid-
ing a resource (a loan) to an applicant in a disadvantaged 
group, but also what happens as a result of that resource 
being allocated. If the borrower defaults, his/her credit score 
will decline, potentially precluding the borrower from future 
loans. It is important to view fairness, not in isolation at 
a moment in time, but rather, in the context of long-term 
objectives in promoting the customer’s financial well-being. 
This is a part of the context we formalise in our Key Ethics 
Indicator proposal.
5.2  Liberty in algorithmic ethics: autonomy 
and explicability
Fairness should also be assessed within the context of how 
the algorithm affects human liberty, a subject in welfare 
economics that is relevant to the AI ethics principles of 
autonomy and explicability. Fleurbaey argues responsibil-
ity-sensitive egalitarianism in welfare economics should 
move away from “responsibility,” which may overlook cer-
tain people’s lack of freedom to choose alternatives, and 
towards “autonomy” [19]. In other words, for there to be 
“true” equality, three conditions must be met: (1) a mini-
mum level of autonomy is attained, (2) with a minimum 
level of variety and quality of options offered, (3) with a 
minimum decision-making competence [19]. A comprehen-
sive egalitarian theory of justice is not just about equalising 
available opportunities but also about providing adequate 
opportunities and making them accessible. As per our defi-
nition of AI ethics [20], we define autonomy as the power 
to decide, striking a balance between the decision-making 
power humans retain and that which we delegate to artifi-
cial agents. We also define explicability as the combination 
of intelligibility (how it works) and accountability (who is 
responsible for the way it works). It complements the other 
four principles by helping us understand the good or harm 
an algorithmic system is actually doing to society, in which 
ways, and why [20].
5.2.1  Autonomy: Liberty
In enforcing some of the stricter fairness conditions, deci-
sion-makers should be careful as to the potential impact this 
has on human autonomy. Luck egalitarians, for instance, 
have no principled objection to a society in which, on a back-
ground of equal opportunities, some end up in poverty or as 
the slaves of others [19]—this could violate fundamental 
human rights to freedom and result in undesirable levels of 
extreme societal inequality. Intervention is necessary when 
basic autonomy is at stake, and this should be a constraint 
on definition of fairness. Fleurbaey argues this is consistent 
with egalitarian welfare economics, as egalitarians should 
be concerned not only with equality of opportunities, but 
also with the content of the opportunities themselves, with 
freedom as the leading principle in defining responsibility 
in social justice [19].
By focusing on equality of opportunities, one may dis-
miss the differences in preferences as driven by choice and 
thus irrelevant. However, Fleurbaey argues that the ex post 
inequalities due to differences in preferences are also a target 
for intervention on the grounds of improving the range of 
choices to suit everyone’s preferences. If more women prefer 
lower-paid positions than men, what is problematic is not 
only the societal and environnmental conditioning that ques-
tions whether this is a genuine preference, but also the unfair 
advantage that attaches to these jobs—a differential value 
of the “menu” of options for women than for men because 
of their preferences [19]. Considerations of fairness and the 
associated policy response must operate at the level of the 
menu, rather than distribution of jobs themselves.
5.2.2  Autonomy: forgiveness
Fleurbaey also discusses a concept that is not addressed in 
algorithmic fairness literature: forgiveness. He argues that 
the ideal of freedom and autonomy contains the idea of 
“fresh starts”: in absence of cost to others, it is desirable to 
give people more freedom and a greater array of choices in 
the future [19]. This is in conflict with the “unforgiving con-
ception of equality of opportunities” that ties individuals to 
the consequences of one’s choices [19]. In many countries, 
lenders are restricted in their access to information about 
borrowers’ past defaults; for example, many delinquencies 
are removed from US credit reports after seven years [17]. 
Forcing a lender to ignore information about past behaviour 
may reduce the accuracy of its default prediction model, and 
it may be “unfair” by some definitions by putting those who 
have made more responsible financial decisions on equal 
level as those who have not; however, it is widely accepted 
practice to ensure that one decision does not have a dispro-
portionate impact of limiting one’s access to credit for good. 
A more complete coverage of fairness and justice, therefore, 
should go beyond redistribution of outcome features and 
consider the impact on individual welfare, autonomy, and 
freedom.
5.2.3  Autonomy: vulnerability
Autonomy in rational decision-making also falters as an ethi-
cal objective when there is a significant asymmetry of power 
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and information between two parties. Contractarian perspec-
tives on fairness assumes two equal entities exchanging one 
resource for another[23].
Those with limited autonomy include vulnerable custom-
ers. When an algorithm targets and manipulates those with 
no other options, they do not have the autonomy to enter 
into the contract, whether or not the contract is fair. Payday 
loans and check cashing industry in the US targets those 
who cannot access traditional financial services, often due 
to their illegal immigration status or long working hours that 
do not provide a break while a bank is open for business, 
entrapping the most vulnerable groups into an unbreakable 
cycle of debt with unaffordable interest rates [48]. While the 
interest rate may not necessarily be unfair (it may in some 
cases be proportional to the likelihood of an individual’s 
repayment), it is ethically undesirable. The same principle 
applies to marketing insurance products to those with recent 
bereavement or the sale of complex financial instruments to 
someone without the capability of understanding their risks.
Another group is those with “thin” files, with a lack of 
or sparse credit history. There has been a movement to use 
“alternative data” or non-traditional data sources that do 
not directly relate to the borrower’s ability to repay. One 
of the most extreme cases is the use of Internet browsing 
history, location, and payment data to calculate credit risk 
[38]. The justification is often that this increases financial 
inclusion for those without alternate means to access credit. 
However, this requires the lender access to more data from 
the currently unbanked populations, disproportionately forc-
ing them to give up more of their privacy than those with 
existing credit histories. It also provides additional risk of 
discrimination, as the non-traditional data sources are likely 
to be closely intertwined with personal characteristics. Loca-
tion and social media data are more likely to reveal an indi-
vidual’s race and gender than credit history. While Kenya’s 
poor were among the first to benefit from digital lending 
applications, they have led to a predatory cycle of debt the 
borrowers describe as a new form of slavery, between the 
endless nudges to borrow, the lenders’ control over a vast 
archive of user data, and the ballooning interest payments 
[13]. This double-standard of privacy between the unbanked 
and banked violates the equal rights of individuals to privacy 
and self-determination. While there may be an exchange of 
access to credit and personal data (e.g. if an individual gives 
consent to a personality test or access to his/her social media 
profile), there should be a protection of their right to privacy.
Fairness overall must be considered in the context of the 
impact on individual human rights—going beyond the equal-
ity of available opportunities, empowering human freedom 
and autonomy to ensure accessibility of these opportunities. 
Computer scientists should learn from the welfare econo-
mists’ consideration of autonomy as a crucial component of 
egalitarian perspectives on fairness.
5.2.4  Explicability
Welfare economics is built on the assumption of rational, 
free agents, which is shared in Kantian ethical philosophy 
[34]. This has been applied to medical ethics to mandate 
that a patient be able to make a fully informed decision on 
whether or not to receive treatment [16]. Similarly, in algo-
rithmic decision-making, individuals consenting to the usage 
of their data should fully understand how the data will be 
used. When humans employ autonomous systems, they cede, 
at least provisionally, some of their own autonomy (deci-
sion-making power) to machines [20]. Respecting human 
autonomy thus becomes a matter of ensuring that both the 
decision-making authority and the subject of the decision 
retain enough autonomy to safeguard their well-being.
In order to incorporate the algorithm into rational deci-
sion-making, it is important to understand how the algo-
rithm reached its prediction or recommendation. Due to the 
relatively limited interpretability of ML, “explainable AI” 
(xAI) is an ongoing area of research [61]. There is often a 
trade-off between accuracy of an algorithm and its explain-
ability, as complex phenomena are better represented by 
complex, “black-box” models than simple and interpretable 
models. This may, in turn, represent a trade-off between 
explainability (and thus a decision-maker’s capability for 
reasoning) and any beneficence afforded by the increase in 
accuracy and model performance. In some use cases, e.g. 
film recommendations, accuracy may outweigh the need for 
explanations. The explanations may also vary based on the 
target of the explanation, e.g. customer, regulator, domain 
experts, or system developers [4]. It is important to under-
stand the interplay between an algorithm’s explanation and 
its perceived fairness. There may be a number of possible 
explanations for any given decision, and the techniques for 
xAI alone do not detect or correct unfair outcomes. How-
ever, the explanations may help identify potential variables 
that are driving the unfair outcomes, e.g. if pricing varies for 
female-dominated professions compared to male-dominated 
professions, the model may be relying on occupation for its 
prediction, which acts as a proxy for gender.
While fairness formalisations may provide a simple 
methodology for model developers to incorporate metrics 
relevant to equalisation of outcomes between groups and 
individuals, they do not provide a holistic view of the impor-
tant debates on what fairness means, as they are discussed 
in ethical philosophy and welfare economics. The narrow 
definition of unfair bias in each of these metrics only pro-
vides a partial snapshot of what inequalities and biases are 
affecting the model and does not consider the long-term and 
big-picture ethical goals beyond this equalisation.
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6  Proposed method: Key Ethics Indicators
In this final section, we propose a new approach that moves 
away from attempts to define fairness mathematically, and 
instead, gain a more holistic view of the ethical considera-
tions of a model. Due to the subjectivity of fairness metrics, 
it may be challenging to select one over another. Rather 
than these general metrics, decision-makers should create 
a customised measurement of what “fair” looks like in each 
model. In addition, fairness should not be considered in iso-
lation from the related ethical goals. The interaction between 
fairness and other values—e.g. welfare, autonomy, and 
explicability—should be taken into account in this analysis.
Contrary to claims otherwise [28], the roles and respon-
sibilities of an engineer are necessarily intertwined with 
the role of the expert or business stakeholder, as the ethi-
cal and practical valuations of what “success” looks like in 
the model directly influences the algorithm design, build, 
and testing. It is important to have active engagement from 
the beginning between the developer and the subject matter 
expert to try to understand which inequalities should influ-
ence the outcome and how to address the inequalities that 
should not play a role in the prediction. This process requires 
engagement from all relevant parties, including the business 
owner and the technical owner, with potential input from 
regulators, customers, and legal experts.
Relying solely on the out-of-the-box fairness definitions 
as implemented in fairness toolkits would fail to capture 
the nuanced ethical trade-offs. There are opportunities for 
open source communities, technology companies, and other 
practitioners to contribute to the toolkits to improve them; 
while this is out of scope of our paper, we have identified the 
key gaps in our previous paper [42].
For a decision-maker, it is important to devise customised 
success metrics specific to the context of each model, which 
as we described, involves considering welfare (beneficence, 
non-maleficence), autonomy, fairness, and explicability. This 
can be done in a following process: 
1. Define “success” from an ethical perspective. What 
is the benefit of a more accurate algorithm to the con-
sumer, to society, and to the system? What are the poten-
tial harms of false positives and false negatives? Are 
there any fundamental rights at stake?
2. Identify the layers of inequality that are affecting the 
differences in outcome
3. Identify the layers of bias
4. Devise an appropriate mitigation strategy. Note this may 
require changes to data collection mechanism or to exist-
ing processes, rather than a technical solution.
5. Operationalise these objectives into quantifiable met-
rics, build multiple models and calculate the trade-offs 
between the objectives covering all ethical and practical 
dimensions.
6. Select the model that best reflects the decision-maker’s 
values and relative prioritisation of objectives.
We now elaborate each of these steps, in turn.
6.1  Define success
For each use case, there are unique considerations on what 
is considered a “successful” model, which are unlikely to 
be captured in a single mathematical formula. In credit risk 
evaluation, for example, three key objectives from ethical, 
regulatory, and practical standpoints are: (1) allocative effi-
ciency: a more accurate assessment of loan affordability 
protects both the lender and the customer from expensive 
and harmful default, (2) distributional fairness: increas-
ing access to credit to disadvantaged borrowers, including 
“thin-file” borrowers and minority groups, (3) autonomy: 
both increased scope of harm due to identity theft and secu-
rity risk and due to the effects of ubiquitous data collection 
on privacy [2]. Here, a successful credit risk model would 
achieve all three objectives. By contrast, in algorithmic hir-
ing, success metrics may include employee performance, 
increased overall diversity among employees and in leader-
ship, and employee satisfaction with the role. It is important 
to identify all the objectives of interest, such that any trade-
offs between them may be easily identified, allowing for a 
more holistic view of algorithmic ethics.
6.2  Identify sources of inequality
As previously discussed, due to the complex and entangled 
sources of inequalities and bias affecting an algorithm, there 
is no simple mathematical solution to unfairness. It is impor-
tant to understand what types of inequality are acceptable vs. 
unacceptable in each use case. Table 2 presented different 
layers of inequality. Considering a credit risk evaluation, 
socioeconomic and talent inequalities may be considered 
relevant: if a man has a higher income than a woman, he 
may receive a higher credit limit given his higher ability to 
repay; higher education level and expertise in a high-demand 
field may indicate greater job security. Forcing the decision-
maker to look beyond the legally protected characteristics to 
identify the inequalities that are acceptable and relevant and 
those that are not helps better identify the sub-groups that 
are at risk of discrimination.
We previously claimed that computer scientists and 
model developers should actively engage in the discus-
sion on what layers of inequality should and should not 
be influencing the model’s prediction in order to inform 
their decisions in the development process. Proposing an 
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accountability mechanism, such as the assignment of roles 
and responsibilities, is not in scope for this paper. How-
ever, we acknowledge the importance of the topic; we have 
addressed how to embed risk government in AI develop-
ment lifecycle in a previous paper [40], and we have mapped 
tools and techniques for unfair bias mitigation to a standard 
organisational risk management lifecycle [43]. We have also 
proposed a framework for “reviewability” to ensure the logs, 
reporting, and audit trail are fit for purpose for understanding 
the AI models [8]. In these papers, we emphasise the need 
for ethical principles to be operationalised into practice and 
embedded into organisational processes, ensuring that the 
right stakeholders are involved at the appropriate stage and 
that the accountability and responsibility of each ethical risk 
is clear.
6.3  Identify sources of bias
In addition to the inequalities discussed above, there may 
be biases in the model development lifecycle that exac-
erbate the existing inequalities between two groups. The 
challenge is that in many cases, the patterns associated 
with the target outcome are also associated with one’s 
identity, including race and gender.
Suresh and Guttang [54] have recently grouped these 
types of biases into 6 categories: historical, representation, 
measurement, aggregation, evaluation, and deployment. 
Historical bias refers to past discrimination and inequali-
ties, and the remaining five biases, displayed in Table 5, 
align to the phases of the model development lifecycle 
(data collection, feature selection, model build, model 
evaluation, and productionisation) that may inaccurately 
skew the predictions. By understanding the type of bias 
that exists, the developer can identify the phase in which 
the bias was introduced, allowing him or her to design a 
targeted mitigation strategy for each bias type.
Table  5 gives examples in racial discrimination in 
lending processes to demonstrate each type of bias. For a 
practical tool in identifying unintended biases in these six 
categories, see [43]. Crucially, they point out that effec-
tive bias mitigation addresses the bias at its source, which 
may involve a non-technical solution. For example, bias 
introduced through the data collection process may require 
a change in marketing strategy.
6.4  Design mitigation strategies
The mitigation strategy depends on whether we believe the 
inequalities in Table 2 and the biases in Table 5 need to be 
actively corrected to rebalance the inequalities and bias. It 
is important to understand the source of the bias in order to 
address it.
There have been existing methods proposed for pre-pro-
cessing, removing bias from the data before the algorithm 
build, in-processing, building an algorithm with bias-related 
constraints, and post-processing, adjusting the output predic-
tions of an algorithm. However, these methods presume that 
inequalities in Table 2 and the biases in Table 5 are known 
Table 5  Layers of bias resulting in inaccurate predictions (partial and indicative)
Types of bias Examples Variable
Representation bias Limited marketing and outreach in high-minority neighborhoods Bias 0
Measurement bias Unequal treatment in the lending process associated with race leads to mis-measurement of risk factors Bias 1
Aggregation bias There may be a difference in default frequency distribution between racial groups, which is poorly represented 
by a single model
Bias 2
Evaluation bias The accuracy and precision metrics in default prediction vary across racial groups (e.g. lower confidence in 
predictions for minority borrowers)
Bias 3
Deployment bias True outcome only known for accepted loans and unknown for denied loans Bias 4
Table 6  Possible actions to counteract biases (*partial and indicative)




Inequality 4 Identify a new feature to estimate income volatility associated with race
Representation bias Bias 0 Change in marketing and outreach strategy to include more high-minority neighborhoods
Measurement bias Bias 1 Employee training on subconscious bias, standardized practice on which loan types are recommended 
based on pre-specified relevant criteria
Deployment bias Bias 2 Continuous monitoring and analysis of whether the decision boundary between rejection and accept-
ance is appropriate
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and can be quantified and surgically removed. How do we 
isolate the impact of talent and preference inequalities on 
income from the impact of discrimination? The attempt to 
“repair” the proxies to remove the racial bias has been shown 
to be impractical and ineffective when the predictors are cor-
related to the protected characteristic; even strong covariates 
are often legitimate factors for decisions [11].
Often, the solution to these biases is not technical because 
their sources are not inherent in the technique. Instead of 
looking for a mathematical solution, there may be produc-
tive ways of counteracting these biases with changes to the 
process and strategy. Examples are shown in Table 6.
While the mitigation strategies are important, they are 
unlikely to provide a complete solution to the problem of 
algorithmic bias and fairness. That is because—unlike 
the assumptions underlying fairness formalisations—it is 
often not feasible to mathematically measure and surgi-
cally remove unfair bias from a model, which is affected by 
inequalities and biases that are deeply entrenched in society 
and in the data.
Legal scholars have argued that traditional approach of 
scrutinising the inputs to a model is no longer effective due 
to the rising model complexity. Using Fair Lending law as an 
example, Gillis demonstrates that identifying which features 
are relevant vs. irrelevant fails to address discrimination con-
cerns because combinations of seemingly relevant inputs 
may drive disparate outcomes between racial group [24]. 
Rather than focusing on identifying and justifying inputs and 
policies that drive disparities, Gillis argues, it is important 
to shift to an outcome-focused analysis of whether a model 
leads to impermissible outcomes [24]. Similarly, Lee and 
Floridi have proposed an approach to assess whether the 
outcome of a model is desirable [41]. For a more compre-
hensive analysis of whether a model meets the stakeholders’ 
ethical criteria, it is important to look beyond the inputs and 
the designer’s intent and assess the long-term and holistic 
outcome.
6.5  Operationalise Key Ethics Indicators (KEIs), 
calculate trade‑offs between KEIs
Once “success” for a model has been defined at a high-level, 
the next step is to operationalise the ethical principles such 
that they are measurable. Similarly to how a company may 
define a set of quantifiable values to gauge its achievements 
using Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), there should be 
outcome-based, quantifiable statements from an ethical 
standpoint: Key Ethics Indicators (KEI), enabling develop-
ers to manage and track to what extent each model is meet-
ing the stated objectives.
For example, Lee and Floridi estimate the impact of each 
default risk prediction algorithm on financial inclusion and 
on loan access for black borrowers [41]. They operationalise 
financial inclusion as the total expected value of loans under 
each model and minority loan access as the loan denial rate 
of black applicants under each model. In Fig. 1 replicated 
from their work, they calculate the trade-offs between the 
two objectives for five algorithms, providing actionable 
insights for all stakeholders on the relative success of each 
model.
Context-specific KEIs can be developed for each use case. 
For example, in algorithmic hiring, employee satisfaction with 
a role may be estimated by attrition rates and employee ten-
ure, employee performance may be measured through their 
annual review process, and diversity may be calculated across 
gender, university, region, age group, and race, depending on 
each organisation’s objectives and values. Making explicit the 
ethical objectives in each use case would help decision-makers 
justify the use of any algorithm, which could in turn lead to the 
establishment of industry standards, informing best practices, 
policy design, and regulatory activity.
6.6  Select a model and provide justifications
The trade-off analysis makes the ethical considerations clear. 
For example, in Fig. 2, Lee and Floridi conclude that Random 
forest is better in absolute terms (in both financial inclusion 
and impact on minorities) than Naïve Bayes, but the decision is 
more ambiguous between CART and LR: while CART is more 
accurate and results in greater financial inclusion (equivalent 
of $15.6 million of loans, or 103 median-value loans), CART 
results in a 3.8 percentage points increase in denial rates for 
black loan applicants compared to LR. This quantifies the 
concrete stakes to the decision-maker who may decide on the 
model that is most suited to his or her priorities, customised 
to each use case.
One of the key benefits of the outcome-driven KEI trade-off 
analysis is that it provides interpretable and actionable insights 
into the decision-maker’s values, which is especially important 
for complex machine learning algorithms in which the exact 
Fig. 1  Replicated from Lee and Floridi (2020): Trade-off analysis
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mechanism may not be transparent or interpretable. This could 
also provide valuable justification to the regulator on why a 
certain model was seen as preferable to all other reasonable 
alternatives. This may also help reduce the hesitation among 
decision-makers around the use of machine learning models 
due to their non-transparent risks, if the analysis shows they 
are superior to traditional rules-based models in meeting each 
of the KEIs. Suitable records of the decisions must be kept, 
ensuring the model and its design are reviewable [8].
7  Conclusion
Implementations of fairness toolkits have predominantly 
implemented mathematical fairness definitions without locat-
ing their implications in overall algorithmic ethics. One of our 
contributions is to derive lessons from ethical philosophy and 
from welfare economics on what are the contextual consid-
erations that are important in assessing an algorithm’s ethics 
beyond what can be captured in a mathematical formula. For 
example, we refer to the debate in ethical philosophy on what 
constitutes acceptable vs. unacceptable inequalities. We also 
relate to the explicit consideration in welfare economics of 
welfare and liberty, which are associated with algorithmic eth-
ics principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and 
explicability. Over-reliance on fairness metrics would capture 
only one dimension of an algorithm’s ethical impact.
As a step forward, our second contribution is the proposal 
of a generalised “Key Ethics Indicator” (KEI) approach that 
explicitly forces a consideration of the ethical objectives, 
aligning to the contextual features that we have drawn out 
as important in ethical philosophy and welfare economics 
literature. The widespread discomfort with the use of ML 
to make decisions derives from the tension between the 
opportunity provided by algorithms that can more accurately 
predict an outcome and the risk of systematically reinforc-
ing existing biases in the data and the risk of undermining 
human autonomy. On the other hand, unlike human sub-
conscious biases, machine predictions can be systemati-
cally audited, debated, and improved. By understanding the 
holistic ethical considerations of each algorithmic decision-
making process using KEIs, decision-makers can be bet-
ter informed about the value judgements, assumptions, and 
consequences of their algorithmic design, opening up the 
conversations with regulators and with society on what is 
an ethical decision.
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